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I study the eﬀect of workers’ motivation on the ﬁrm’s choice of how much auton-
omy employees should be given. The main hypothesis of the paper is that employers
give autonomy to workers who are already especially motivated. The empirical work
is based on data from Wave 1 of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a nation-
ally representative longitudinal study of health, retirement, and aging. The HRS
provides unique information on individual’s motives and autonomy on the job. Es-
timating a continuous latent variable model, I ﬁnd evidence that motivated workers
are more likely to be in autonomous jobs, and that they receive higher wages in
autonomous jobs.
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11 Introduction
Do ﬁrms use autonomy to motivate workers, or do they give autonomous jobs to workers
who are already especially motivated? Most studies on delegation of responsibility and
autonomy concentrate on the conﬂict between two opposite eﬀects: autonomy stimulates
workers to acquire information; however, in giving workers autonomy, employers lose some
control over procedures and outcomes. Thus, ﬁrms oﬀer autonomous jobs as a nonmon-
etary incentive to promote worker motivation. But surprisingly, little attention has been
given to the details of the practice of giving autonomy to especially motivated workers:
for example, does autonomy in fact trigger motivation? In contrast, an observation in the
literature on social psychology is that people’s job performance and how they handle new
information reﬂect their motives, drives, and emotions.
I study empirically the eﬀect of workers’ motivation on the ﬁrm’s choice of how much
autonomy employees should be given. I test whether employers give autonomy to workers
who are already especially motivated.
I use data from Wave 1 of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a nationally
representative longitudinal study of health, retirement, and aging. The HRS provides
unique information on autonomy and motivation.
W h a tm o t i v a t e sp e o p l ei saq u e s t i o nt h a th a sb een present in the psychology literature
for a long time. Deci (1971) developed the idea that people might be driven by motives
that reﬂect their needs and goals. Deci called the resulting motivation intrinsic, in contrast
with what is known as externally or extrinsically driven (by rewards) behavior. Intrinsic
motivation (IM hereafter) has also been introduced to the management literature (see for
example Galbraith, 1977 and Staw, 1989) as the motivation to perform a task, or to achieve
speciﬁc outcomes. For example, professional pilots enjoy ﬂying, while environmental
workers ﬁght for the cause of clean nature. Galbraith and Staw argue that IM can be
stimulated by developing a work environment where people can achieve their goals, and
2one way to do this is by providing autonomy. Autonomy, however, is a necessary, but not
as u ﬃcient condition to induce better performance. Workers have to be interested in the
task, i.e., they have to be already motivated to do the job.
If workers are motivated or unmotivated, oﬀering autonomous jobs to unmotivated
workers will not necessarily stimulate them to be more motivated. Pyszczynski & Green-
berg (1987) and Baumeister & Newman (1994) show that a motivated worker is driven
by motivation to search, while an unmotivated worker is driven by motivation to ignore,
i.e., motivated people have a lower cost of processing information than unmotivated ones.
Motivated people show enthusiasm for acquiring information that is useful for the
production process. A motivated worker will believe that a certain way of doing the job
is the one that would bring the best results. He would therefore be discouraged if asked
to follow other alternatives. In an organization where employees have no autonomy in
decision making, a motivated worker would need stronger incentives to work than an
unmotivated worker, who acquires no information about how best to get the job done.
It follows that the employer may ﬁnd it optimal to give autonomy to motivated workers,
but not to the unmotivated ones.
The introduction of motivation to the discussion suggests some empirical predictions.
If motivated people place a lower cost on processing information, then autonomy is less
costly for motivated people than for unmotivated ones. Therefore, holding other things
constant, motivated people will prefer autonomous jobs. Furthermore, employers would
value motivated people in autonomous jobs more highly than unmotivated people in
autonomous jobs. I ﬁnd evidence that employers are willing to pay motivated people in
autonomous jobs higher wages than unmotivated people in autonomous jobs.
32 Literature Review
Standard assumption in microeconomics is that eﬀort is costly and brings disutility. But
if intrinsically motivated people enjoy working, they will experience positive utility of
eﬀort. (See Fehr & Falk, 2001). In contrast, ﬁndings from psychology demonstrate that
people may not always have an increasing eﬀort cost. Classic examples are experimental
settings (Deci & Ryan, 1985) where participants perform tasks without being rewarded.
The initial studies on IM are attempts to deal with the possibility that monetary
incentives might crowd-out IM (Frey, 1997 and Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Benabou &
Tirole (2002) oﬀer a cognitive perspective to IM in a signaling model where the employer
has private information about the worker’s ability or the nature of the task. Workers
conclude what their motivation is based on a signal received from the employer. Therefore,
workers in autonomous job might think that the employer trusts them or values their work.
The implication is that autonomy inspires motivation. This approach is an application of
the psychological theory of self-perception developed by Bem (1972).
There are very few studies generating the prediction that autonomy is oﬀered to work-
ers who are already motivated. Murdock (2002) employs the idea that people are moti-
vated by the outcomes of their work (Staw, 1989). Consider, for example, the personal
satisfaction achieved from introducing a new medicine. Murdock calls these outcomes
intrinsic returns (for the worker). A motivated worker would choose to participate in a
project with high intrinsic returns, even when it brings ﬁnancial loss. The employer can
still gain from accepting such a project, given that the total surplus from all projects is
positive. The implication of this model is that autonomy, rather than inspiring motivation,
is given to intrinsically motivated employees.
I now turn to the literature on autonomy and decision rights. The main observation
in this literature is that autonomy is determined by the structure of information. A study
that is closely related to the present paper is Aghion & Tirole (1997). They investigate
4the two-way interaction between authority and information, where ”real authority” is
deﬁned as the ”eﬀective control over decisions in organizations.” Autonomy stimulates the
workers’ initiative to acquire information, but it usually comes with some costs. Employers
lose control from not being able to exercise their power over all decisions. Losses of
information are also possible. The model has certain implications for the delegation of
decision-making rights: delegation is more likely when the employer trusts the worker, or
when the activities are innovative and the employer does not have prior experience in the
area.
3D a t a
The HRS Wave 1 data collection was completed in 1992, and covers 12,521 men and
women, born between 1931 and 1941. I have constructed a sample including 6,375 people.
Those without jobs and the self-employed are excluded from the sample. People with a
wage rate below a $1 per hour and those with more than $150 per hour are excluded as
well. Respondents are classiﬁed as motivated if they strongly agreed or agreed with the
question addressing motivation. Second group, classiﬁed as unmotivated includes people
who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Table 1 presents the sample
distribution of the answers.
More than 50 percent of the sample agreed that they would work even if they did not
need the money, while only 12 percent strongly agreed. This result holds for both males
and females, with the more impressive 55 percent for females. Approximately a quarter
of the sample disagreed, for both males and females; and less than 10 percent strongly
rejected the possibility of working when they would not need the money.
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Table 1 - Even if I didn't need the money, I would probably keep on working 
 Male  Female  All 
 number  proportion  number  proportion number proportion 
strongly  agree 372  0.12 403 0.12 775  0.12 
agree  1,  568  0.52 1,  848 0.55 3,  416  0.54 
disagree 781  0.26  832 0.25  1,  613  0.25 
strongly  disagree  298  0.10 273 0.08 571  0.09 
Total  3,  019  0.47 3,  356 0.53 6,  375  100 
    Source:HRS Wave 1 (1992). 
 
Table 2 reports the sample descriptive statistics by motivation. Respondents answer
the autonomy question with: all or almost all of the time, most of the time, some of the
time, none or almost none of the time. Thirty percent of the sample reported having
freedom all or almost all of the time. These people form the autonomous group.
 
  Table 2 - Sample descriptive statistics by motivation 
 Motivated  Umotivated  All 
  mean st.dev. mean  st.dev.  mean  st.dev. 
Autonomy 0.35  0.48 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Male 0.46  0.50 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50
White 0.75  0.43 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44
Years of educ.  13  3 12 3 13 3
Experience 36 6 37 6   36 6
Union 0.23  0.42 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44
Hourly wage  12.43  8.02 12.69 7.48 12.52 7.84
Hours per 
year 
2015 620 2035 539 2022 593
N:  4191 2184 6375
      Source:HRS  Wave 1 (1992). 
 
The most important diﬀerences between the motivated group and the unmotivated
one are in terms of autonomy, experience, union status, and wage. Among those that are
motivated, 35 percent hold autonomous jobs, while this number is only 25 percent for the
group of the unmotivated people. Further, only 23 percent among the motivated are union
members, vs. 33 percent among the unmotivat e d .O n ep o s s i b l ei n t e r p r e t a t i o nw o u l db e
that motivated people do not need the security provided by a union membership. If this
6is true, it might be reﬂected in the wage. The diﬀerence in the hourly wage shows that
the motivated have relatively lower wages than the unmotivated. In addition to this, they
have relatively less experience.
4 Exploratory Empirical Analysis
I provide in this section expiratory empirical analysis that is helpful for comparing moti-
vated versus unmotivated workers. HRS includes job descriptive characteristics, such as
physical eﬀort, concentration of attention, repetition of operations, learning new things,
freedom to decide how to work, skills in dealing with other people, and stress. Some of
those characteristics might be more distinctive for motivated people, while others apply to
unmotivated people only. For example, one might expect that those who are intrinsically
motivated have jobs that do not require physical eﬀort, repetition of operations, or high
stress burden. Instead, they have a lot of freedom to decide how to do their jobs and face
the challenge of learning new things.
The HRS also provides information on workers’ marginal wage. That is, the wage that
would be received for working one extra hour. One hypothesis would be that people with
zero (or close to zero) marginal wage belong to the group of those that are intrinsically
motivated. Alternatively, those with a high marginal wage are extrinsically motivated.
4.1 Job Descriptive Characteristics
I further proceed with some job descriptive characteristics. Respondents answered one
group of questions describing diﬀerent aspects of their jobs. The responses to these
questions are contrasted for the two groups of intrinsically vs. extrinsically motivated
individuals. In addition, I separate a set of characteristics where motivation matter from
those for which motivation makes no diﬀerence.
74.1.1 First Set of Characteristics - Motivation Matters
Figures 1-3 present the characteristics where motivation matters. Respondents are asked
whether ’they do the same things over and over again’, ’learn new things’ and ’have a lot
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 Intrinsic  Extrinsic
All or almost ... Most of the time Some of the time None or almost...
Figure 2
The diﬀerence between the answers of intrinsically versus extrinsically motivated work-
ers on both Figure 1 and Figure 2 is not big. On Figure 1, diﬀerence between the answers
of intrinsically versus extrinsically motivated workers for those who choose ’All or almost
a l lo ft h et i m e ’i ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The same holds for the ﬁrst three
choices (All or almost all of the time, Most of the time, Some of the time) on Figure 2.
One might expect, however, that repeating the same operations over and over again is
not an element of intrinsically motivated behavior.
On Figure 3, 41 percent of those considered to be intrinsically motivated have a lot
of discretion on how to do their jobs, while only 30 percent of the respondents from the
extrinsically motivated group have freedom. The data supports the cognitive evaluation
theory as well. The ’freedom to decide’ is called self-determination in this theory; people
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All or almost ... Most of the time Some of the time None or almost...
Figure 3
4.1.2 Second Set of Characteristics - Motivation Makes No Diﬀerence
The second set of characteristics includes characteristics that seem to make no diﬀerence
for motivation. Respondents have to access ’physical eﬀort’, ’skills in dealing with other
people’, ’keep up with the pace set by others’ and ’stress’ as factors. Both groups exhibit
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All or almost ... Most of the time Some of the time None or almost...
Figure 5
T h ec a s eo fp h y s i c a le ﬀort might be viewed as surprising, since one might expect this
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Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
Figure 7
4.2 Extra Hours Work
I present here how the behavior of the groups varies with the amount of compensation
for extra hours work. The whole sample consists of four categories formed on the base of
their type of pay. These are salaried workers, hourly paid, workers with piece rates and
commissions, and other types of pay. The largest group is the group of hourly paid workers,
56 percent. Those with salaries are 40.3 percent of the sample. I observe these two groups
only. Figure 8 shows the percentage of salaried workers with and without compensation for
e x t r at i m ew o r k .T h ed i ﬀerence in the responses between the intrinsically and extrinsically
motivated groups is nonsigniﬁcant. This is not a surprising result when we take into



































 Intrinsic  Extrinsic
Compensation No compensation
Figure 9
Things are diﬀerent for hourly paid workers. 34 percent of the respondents from the
intrinsically motivated group vs. 48 from the extrinsically motivated one have compensa-
tion for working extra hours. When there is no compensation the result is reversed, and
10the gap is even bigger and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. This behavioral
pattern is diﬀerent. The separation between intrinsically motivated respondents with and
those without compensation is clearer, 34 vs. 66 percent.
The last ﬁgure in this section shows what percentage of the respondents in the two
groups is required to work overtime. It conﬁrms the expectation that intrinsically moti-
vated people are more likely to have extended working hours. The pattern pointed out in
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Kernel Density Estimate - Salaried
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In this section, I exploit the information on marginal wages applying kernel density es-
timation of the marginal wage rate. Respondents answer the following question: If you
worked an extra hour, how much would you earn for that hour? Based on this information,
I calculate an hourly wage for this additional hour and perform the kernel density esti-
mation for salaried and hourly paid workers only. In the case of piece rates, commissions,
and other types of pay the number of observations is very small, with many outliers.
I also apply kernel density estimation of the marginal wage rate to the whole sample.
The result is presented on Figure 13. One can see that for marginal wages between zero
and ﬁve the two densities drop sharply. The eﬀect is more explicit for the intrinsically mo-
tivated group. However, for zero marginal wages, the density of the intrinsically motivated
group is far above the density of the group with extrinsic motivation. I construct further
11the cumulative density functions of the two groups. My hypothesis is that at least for
the ﬁrst half of the range between 0 and 40 dollars marginal hourly wage, the cumulative
density function of the intrinsically motivated group is above the one of the extrinsically
motivated group. The explanation in mind would be that intrinsically motivated people
are more willing to work for a lower payment. Indeed, this is the result presented on
Figure 14. I also apply a two-sample test for equality of distribution functions. The test
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5 Empirical Model and Estimation
I apply a continuous latent variable model. The job consists of two dimensions: wage
rate, W, and a non-wage job attribute, autonomy, A.T h u s , t h e w a g e , W0,o ﬀered by
the employer deﬁnes the set of jobs determined by the wage and nonwage component,
12available to a worker with human capital X and motivation M is:
W0 = Xβ + α1M + α2MA+ α3A + ε. (1)
X includes variables such as age, education, and labor market experience, which can
be observed, together with some unobservable variables, such as intelligence, ability to
work in a group, etc. I assume that a job with autonomy is more costly to the ﬁrm
and pays less to the employee. Employers incur losses of information and control. If
all workers prefer autonomy, ﬁrms have to oﬀer higher wages for less autonomous jobs.
Let α3 denote the compensating wage diﬀerential associated with autonomy. This is the
forgone wage for accepting a job with a higher level of discretion. Let α2 be the wage
diﬀerential for a motivated person.
Among workers, there is heterogeneity in the monetary value, V ∗, of working in an
autonomous job:
V
∗ = ZΓ + γM + v, (2)
where Z is a vector of characteristics that may also aﬀect preferences for autonomy. Those
characteristics are: property rights in jobs, security, ﬂexible time, and establishment size.
Property rights in jobs are captured with two diﬀerent variables. The HRS provides two
measures of seniority-based job ladders: ﬁrst, whether the employer gives younger people
preference over older people in decisions about promotion, and second, whether older
workers feel the pressure to retire before age 65. The security variable addresses the issue
of workers’ certainty about keeping their jobs for the year that follows. On a scale from
0 (absolutely no certainty) to 10 (absolutely certainty) they were asked how likely it is
that they would lose their jobs during the following year. ‘Flexible time’ is a dichotomous
variable, which takes the value of one if employees work on a ﬂexible schedule.
The value of autonomy, V ∗, does not depend on the wage, but rather is the value
that every worker places on autonomy, regardless of the wage oﬀered to him. This value
13depends on motivation.
The cost of taking an autonomous job for a person with a given set of characteristics
X and motivation M is α2M +α3. Therefore, people choose autonomous jobs when their
value is higher than the cost they would incur:
Pr(A =1 |M)=Pr(ZΓ + γM + v>α2M + α3)( 3 )
= Pr(v>(α2 − γ)M − ZΓ + α3), (4)
where Pr(A =1 |M) is the probability of being in an autonomous job given motivation.
The model is:
W = Xβ + α1M +( α2M + α3)A + ε (5)
V
∗ = ZΓ + γM + v (6)
A =1 if V
∗ > α2M + α3 (7)
A = 0 otherwise (8)
The error terms (ε,v) are jointly normally distributed. To estimate the system I use
the two-stage procedure developed in Heckman (1979). People who place a higher value
on autonomy on the job might self-select into certain type of jobs that provide autonomy.
If these jobs provide a lower wage, based upon the intuition that autonomy is costly for the
ﬁrm, then ε and v will be correlated. Alternatively, the jobs with autonomy might come
with higher wages in places where monitoring is diﬃcult or cannot be done eﬃciently.
In both cases there will be a correlation between ε and v that requires correction for
selection. If (ε,v) are independent, the estimation amounts to applying OLS to equation
(1) and a Probit to equation (2).
146 Results
The coeﬃcients in the probit model are reported Table 3. Motivated people value au-
tonomous jobs more than unmotivated people. Males are more likely to prefer autonomy
than females. Race and education do not have a signiﬁcant impact.
Table 3 Probit Model of Autonomy         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Motivation 0.057**  0.059**  0.059**  0.059** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Male 0.072**  0.076**  0.076**  0.060** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
White 0.020  0.028*  0.028*  0.022 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Years of Education  0.012**  0.013**  0.013**  0.014** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Experience 0.003**  0.003**  0.003**  0.003** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ladder1 -0.051**  -0.052**  -0.052**  -0.052** 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Ladder2 -0.076**  -0.075**  -0.075**  -0.082** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Security -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.016** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Flex time  0.085**  0.085**  0.085**  0.089** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Union Membership  -0.084**  -0.085**  -0.085**  -0.098** 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
        
        
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Occup. Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Size Dummies  Yes  No  No  No 
        
        
Observations 6374  6374  6374  6374 
Log likelihood  -4008.273 -4008.273 -4008.273 -4008.273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
The coeﬃcients on the Z variables show that individuals who work in a place where
the employer prefers younger people over older in decisions about promotions, or where
older workers feel pressure to retire before age 65, hold a lower value of autonomy on the
job. It seems that when workers are concerned about keeping their jobs, whether there
is autonomy on the job or not is less signiﬁcant for them. These results reﬂect the age
15proﬁl eo ft h es a m p l e .T h es a m eh o l d sf o rp e o p l ew h oa r ec e r t a i nt h a tt h e yw o n ’ tb ea b l e
to keep their jobs for the year that follows. Further, people who have the opportunity
to work on ﬂexible time schedules place higher value on autonomous jobs. And ﬁnally,
union members place a lower value on autonomy on the job. This might be interpreted
that workers would prefer unionized versus autonomous jobs. However, one might think
that jobs that tend to be unionized provide a lower level of autonomy.
 
Table  4  Wage  Equation       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Motivation  -0.062** -0.059** -0.061** -0.061** -0.059** 
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Autonomy*Motivation 0.062*  0.057*  0.058*  0.058*  0.045 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Autonomy 0.048*  0.051*  0.048*  0.048*  0.046* 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021) 
Male 0.250**  0.250**  0.247**  0.247**  0.271** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
White 0.051**  0.056**  0.050**  0.050**  0.059** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
H. worked (per year)  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of Education  0.078**  0.079**  0.080**  0.080**  0.084** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Experience 0.022**  0.022**  0.022**  0.022**  0.025** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Experience  squared  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Union Membership  0.128**  0.155**  0.155**  0.155**  0.192** 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
       
       
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Occup. Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Size  Dummies  Yes  Yes  No No No 
Region  Dummies  Yes No No No No 
       
       
Observations  6277 6277 6277 6277 6277 
R-squared  0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Dependent variable is log-hourly wage.  
 
For example, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 1998 the highest percent-
age of US wage and salary workers in the private sector is observed in Transportation,
Manufacturing, and Construction. Thus, one cannot conclude that workers prefer union
16membership to autonomy on the job.
Since the two error terms, ε and v, turn out to be independent, the estimation pro-
cedure is simpliﬁed to a simple OLS applied to the wage equation and a Probit to the
autonomy equation. The results from the O L Se s t i m a t i o na r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e4 .
The human capital variables have standard signs. After controlling for both autonomy
and motivation, motivated people in autonomous jobs have higher wages. Therefore, the
employer is willing to pay a premium, α2 > 0, to a motivated person in an autonomous
job. From the probit equation, I have found that motivated people are more likely to
be in autonomous jobs, or (α2 − γ) > 0. This result, together with the positively signed
γ, means that the premium that the employer pays is greater than the reduction in pay
that the worker is willing to accept. It is impossible, however, to ﬁnd the sign of α2.T h e
monetary value of autonomy to a motivated person, γ, holding the wage constant, could
be positive or negative.
7 Conclusions
I use data from Wave 1 of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) that provides unique
information on autonomy and individual’s motives. I start with an exploratory empirical
analysis. My goal is to present some descriptive characteristics that might help understand
the very idea of motivation and autonomy as reﬂected in the data. In particular, it helps
with the comparison between motivated and unmotivated workers.
I apply a continuous latent variable model, where both the latent variable and its real-
ized qualitative variable are included in the model. I have ﬁnd that motivated workers are
more likely to be in autonomous jobs, and that they receive higher wages in autonomous
jobs than unmotivated workers in autonomous jobs. This implies that employers value
motivated workers in autonomous jobs more highly than unmotivated workers in au-
tonomous jobs. Thus, employers would be more willing to give autonomy to motivated
17workers.
Also, when there is autonomy on the job, the eﬀect of motivation on the wage is pos-
itive but small, while with no autonomy on the job, motivated people get lower wages.
Although this result seems to be contradictory at ﬁr s ts i g h t ,i tr e ﬂects some of the prop-
e r t i e so ft h es a m p l eu n d e rs t u d y , m a i n l y ,t h ea g ep r o ﬁle of the sample. It might reﬂect,
for example, the fact that respondents who answer the question whether they would work
if they did not need the money might not necessarily have in mind their motivation to
work. But instead, that they would still work to keep their social contacts as opposed to
staying at home. Or, they might want to feel helpful, or belong to an organization, or
for other reasons that have little or nothing to do with their internal motivation to work.
And for these very reasons those people would work even if they might be paid less, or if
there is no autonomy on the job. These eﬀects, unfortunately, cannot be separated.
In general, the empirical results support the basic idea of the paper that motivation
triggers autonomy and that employers give autonomy to workers who are already espe-
cially motivated.
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